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Franciscans Eclipsed
CHURCH AND STATE IN SPANISH NEW MEXICO,

1750-1780

Jim Norris

T

he Franciscan mission system, in what the Spanish called the Kingdom

of New Mexico, challenged local civil government for power and influence from the time of the colony's permanent inception in 1598. At its zenith
in the seventeenth century, the Order of St. Francis maintained over forty
missions and as many as seventy friars labored in New Mexico. Their control
over the Puebloan peoples meant that the order held significant dominion
over the region's main economic asset: Indian labor. As the sole representatives of the Catholic Ch urch in New Mexico, the Franciscan friars controlled
spiritual affairs and shaped the moral behavior of all inhabitants. Using the
powers ofthe Inquisitioi-I, the friars protected their own status and attempted,
with some success, to expand their position at the expense of local government officials. The Franciscans' efforts did not go unchallenged, however,
and acrimonious struggles often characterized church and state relations.
Events associated with the Pueblo Revolt in 1680 and the subsequent Spanish reconquest in the 1690S altered the equation between the Franciscan friars
and civil authority. Civil and military affairs now began to dominate the
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Spanish government's policy on the northern frontier of New Spain, and
during the next half century, Franciscans' status and authority in New Mexico diminished in relation to those of political and military officials. The friars
struggled to maintain their position and remained, at least, an influential
institution up to 1750. However, by 1780, the Franciscans had permanently
lost their authority and prestige in New Mexico.
In 1749 fray Andres Varo, cwdos (prelate) of the Franciscan priests in New
Mexico, finished an extensive informe (report) on the condition of the order's
mission efforts in the region. Varo's informe was the first such Franciscan selfexamination in over thirty years and had been specifically solicited by the
viceroy of New Spain in Mexico City. Propably no one was more qualified
to draft the report than fray Andresfor he had arrived in New Mexico in 1729
and had been custos at least three times since then,l
Varo's informe described a robust and vital mission operation in New
Mexico. The report listed three mission districts (Santa Fe, El Paso, and Junta
de los Rios), described their physical environments, and reported their livestock and agricultural capacities. Most missions produced surplus commodities for later distribution among the region's poor, who, the custos regretted,
were numerous. Every mission in the region had at least one friar assigned
to it except for Pecos and Galisteo, which together were served by a single
missionary. Eight friars labored among the Navajos. The two Navajo missions
established in the 1740S represented a significant triumph for the Franciscans
as the sites of their first new conversions in over a century. In addition, the
friars had stepped up their evangelical efforts among the Hopis and induced
over four hundred Tiwas, descendants of refugees from the 1690S reconquest
e~a, to leave the Hopis and congregate in anew mission at Sandia. The Crown
rewarded this surge in Franciscan evangelical activity with the restoration of
the order's jurisdiction over the Hopis, which had been given to the Jesuits
during the 1730S. Hence, at the end of the 1740s, the Franciscans had regained'some of their prestige and influence lost during their dark half-century after the Pueblo Revolt in 1680. 2
Such was clearly not the case a quarter century later when fray Francisco
Atanasio Dominguez wrote his comprehensive assessment of the New Mexico mission field in 1776. Dominguez arrived in New Mexico with orders to
inspect each mission and report on its condition. He was also to evaluate each
friar's evangelical performance, adherence to the rules of St. Francis, and
ability to speak Puebloan languages. He could transfer and discipline friars
as needed, although he "must not be too vociferous lest the defects of his
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brethren became known to the public." In short, the Franciscan leadership
desired that Dominguez improve the mission operation in New Mexico.'
Dominguez found the Franciscan missions in appalling condition. That
all the region's churches had earthen floors after so many years of use surprised him, and he was shocked that no church had been constructed yet at
Sandia; the Puebloans there made do in the ruins ofa pre-168o mission building. At Santa Clara, fray Francisco reported the church's adornments "so
soulless that I consider it unnecessary to describe anything so dead." He often
described vestments and other religious articles as "very worn" or "ugly." He
found the figure of Our Lady of the Rosary at San Juan decorated with "gewgaws," her dress and mantle "tattered," and a "moth-eaten wig" upon her
head. Over half the mission bells, one of the most enduring symbols of Spanish mission churches, did not function. They were broken, cracked, or miss~
ing their clappers. At Santa Ana, ironically, the neophytes were summoned
to mass with a "war drum."4
The Christian behavior of the Puebloans lagged far behind Dominguez's
expectations as well. Instruction in matters of the faith followed a sterile formula from mission to mission. Children simply recited the catechism at church
.each morning and evening, while adults did the same only on Saturdays and
feast days, when the Rosary was also said. Beyond mere memorization and
recitation, little else was done. Only two missions-Acoma and Jemez-employed more energetic and innovative teaching methods. The central problem, fray Francisco opined, was language. Few friars were fluent in the
language of their charges and Spanish fluency among the Puebloans was only
somewhat better. At only five missions had native people become fairly proficient in Spanish. Hence, confession was rare, except in cases of dire illnesses
or approaching death, perhaps because penitents feared what interpreters
would overhear. 5
His brother friars and their behaviors most disappointed Dominguez, although he circumscribed his comments in the official report. Significantly,
there were only about thirty friars in New Mexico, a decline of approximately
twenty-five percent since Yaro's report. The strongest official criticisms he
levied were that church registers were not up-to-date or that a friar's inventory of Franciscan property was inconsistent with his own findings. In private
letters written to Franciscan officials, however, Dominguez was more candid
and harsh in his evaluations. Many friars were too "old and ill" to be effective mission priests. One, fray Estanislai Mariano de Marulanda, had gone
blind. Dominguez judged at least nine Franciscans as physically incapable
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of managing their missions. Other friars were ineffective for more heinous reasons. Some were disobedient, others wanted only to obtain "temporal goods"
for themselves, and several were in debt to support their extravagances. One
friar had "borrowed" over seven hundred pesos fro~ the tithe. At least tWo
others were engaged in carnal relations with women employed in their conventos. Fray Patricio Cuellar was "a notorious drunkard," and still others were
"depraved, disobedient, bold characters and brothers who carry knive.s and
blunderbusses as ifthey were highwaymen." Including the infirm, Dominguez
concluded that over half of the Franciscans serving in the colony had no business doing so. Clearly, the Franciscans' position had undergone a dramatic
collapse since Varo's glowing assessment nearly three decades earlier. 6
In addition to questionable work ethics undermining their status, several
other problems contributed to the demise of the Franciscans' position in New
Mexico during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Friars posted to New
Mexico usually worked alone and continuously for an average of twenty
years, a condition of service that fostered the trend of old and sick mission
priests. Incessant attacks on the missions and settlements by Comanche,
Apache, and other native peoples sapped morale among all the region's inhabitants including the friars. A severe drought during the 1770S only made
the conditions of life more desperate. In addition, the royal treasury only sporadically paid the missionaries their stipends, forcing the friars into commercial activities to support themselves. Once that pattern was established, the
decision of some friars to gain personally involved only a short leap.
While these reasons contributed to the Franciscan breakdown, their impotence in dealing with government officials symbolized starkly their reduced
circumstances. During the seventeenth century the Franciscans in New Mexicowere equally powerful, if not more so, than local government officials. That
several governors were hauled to Mexico City in chains to face the Inquisition
attests to the clout the Franciscans held. However, the Pueblo Revolt of 1680
marked the beginning of a general decline in the friars' hegemony. After this
time, governors and other local officials steadily augmented power at the expense of the Franciscans. Alcaldes nwyores (district officers) became influential in Puebloan politics, governors exerted more control over the region's
economic policies, and even such matters as native witchcraft practices were
taken out of the friars' hands and turned over to New Mexico's civil authorities.
These developments complemented the Bourbon imperial goal of centralizing its authority over other privileged governmental bodies like the Catholic
Church. As a conseq)lence of this aim, the' Crown supported actions of civil
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authorities at the expense of the Franciscans in New Mexico by routinely ruling against the friars in disputes engendered by these changes. Still, not all
governors or alcaldes mayores exploited the new environment. Some were
incompetent, some solely interested in profit, and some in office too briefly.
The Franciscans were losing power; but only in fits and starts.
Beginning in 1750; however, local government officials gained irrevocable
power and position in New Mexico, and the friars found themselves, at last,
relegated permanently to second place. The Franciscans began 1750 on the
defensive and the year progressively worsened. The Franciscans learned that
the Jesuits had made two entradas into the Colorado-Gila region, raising
anew the friars' concerns about jurisdiction among the Hopis.i In addition,
the viceroy appointed don Tomas Velez Cachupfn as interim governor in

1750. Described by one historian as "young, full of ambition and not a little
impetuous," Velez Cachupfn had only recently been assigned to New Mexico to command the Santa Fe presidio's mounted troops prior to his appointment as governor. He would prove to be, however, a very capable governor. 8
Rather than using supplies and soldiers earmarked for the Navajo mission
~ield, the governor diverted these resources to combat Comanche raiders

instead. As a result of this deviation, the newly congregated Navajos bolted
from their missions. Although the rnain reason for their departure centered
on the fundamental differences between Navajos and Spaniards, the Franciscans blamed Velez Cachupfn. Consequently, the new governor found his
administration at odds with the Franciscans from the beginning.
Besides the Navajo incident, a conflict also arose between the Franciscans
and the governor over a report drafted by don Antonio de Ornedal y Maza.
Ornedal y Maza had come to New Mexico in 1749 for two official reasons:
to serve as juez de residencia (court judge) for the 'outgoing governor and to
inspect the presidios in New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya for the viceroy. Nowhere in his written duties was he asked to examine the Franciscan mission
.operation, but either on his own initiative or at the behest of Governor Velez
Cachupfn, Ornedal y Maza composed a critical report of the condition of the
New Mexico missions. 9 His report caused problems for the Franciscans w
The su bstance of most charges was not new, but the timing of the report was
unfortunate. It arrived in Mexico City about the same time, if not in the same
pouch, as Varo's informe. Ornedal y Maza's contradiction ofVaro's assessment outraged and embittered the FraI~ciscans, and their anger placed them
on a collision course with Governor Velez CachupfnY
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Initially, several friars authored lengthy rebuttals to Ornedal y Maza's report.
These categorically refuted all of his criticisms while offering counter allegations of abuse and misuse of power by the governor and alcaldes mayores. According to the Franciscans, Puebloans were forced to labor without pay; their
woven goods and agricultural commodities were taken without fair compensation; and presidial soldiers were ill-equipped and harshly treated by the governor and their officers. Franciscan officials in Mexico City deemed a written
rebuttal by fray Andres so incendiary that they suppressed it and gave only an
abridged version to another viceroy ten years later. Among other accusations,
Varo described Governor Velez Cachupfn as "childish ... without maturity,
knowledge, or experience." The provincial of Santo Evangelio, who oversaw the
New Mexico missions, also wrote a long protest to Ornedal y Maza's report. 12
That Franciscans disputed the report came as no surprise, but to add weight
to their refutations, they collected affidavits from the region's citizens attesting
to the missionaries' exemplary behavior and devout attention to their duties.
Thirteen Spaniards of prominence, including former alcaldes mayores, current presidial officers, and the assistant governor-captain general of Nueva Vizcaya, made testimonialsY Support for the friars from such individuals was
potentially the most effective weapon the friars could marshal against Ornedal
y Maza's report.
At this point Governor Velez Cachupfn did the unexpected and unprecedented: he derailed the entire controversy. First, he moved to unify local
government, forbidding any current alcalde mayor, presidial soldier, or other
government official in New MexIco from testifying either for or against
Ornedal y Maza's report. Second, none of these officials could certify any
Franciscan report. By default, only Velez Cachupfn's signature could legitimize Franciscan documents leaving New Mexico. Any violation of these orders wOllld result in a two hundred peso fine and/orloss of position to the
offender. And finally, to prevent even noncertified information by his Franciscan detractors from reaching Mexico City, the governor directed that no
Franciscan mail, except for correspondence pertaining to the Inquisition,
could leave New Mexico without his approval. In this manner, Velez Cachupfn silenced the friars-something no other governor had been able to
do-without challenging the Inquisition. Even more astonishing was that his
executive intervention worked and Franciscan correspondence from New
Mexico soon slowed to a trickle. 14
The motivations behind the governor's actions remain unclear. Unlike
ITlany of his predecessors, Vdez Cachupfn left no written statements of a
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clearly antireligious or anti-Franciscan nature. He seems to have been less generous to the Franciscans than were many eighteenth-century governors, al- .
though he did purchase new vestments, linens, and an altar screen for the
mission at San Juan. Certainly, New Mexico was under dire military threat by
Comanche raiders in 1750, and the governor likely viewed the Ornedal y Maza
matter as a distraction, with the potential to factionalize his administration. I;
In addition to external political difficulties, conditions soon worsened for the
Franciscans when an internal struggle erupted. Realizing that Governor Velez
Cachupfn exempted Inquisition reports from civil interference, custos Varo
requested that fray Pedro Montano, local commissary of the Holy Office, initiate an Inquisition investigation against the governor. The immediate consequence of such an inquiry would have been testimonials, interrogations, and
related documents leaving New Mexico unimpeded. Furthermore, Inquisition involvement might have intimidated Velez Cachupfn, put him on the
defensive, or even lead to his removal from office. That strategy had often
worked in the seventeenth century. Montano, though, refused to open the
investigation, and the ensuing conflict between him and Varo plunged the
Franciscans into turmoil for two years. At a time when they most needed to
present a united front, they instead turned against each other, further weakening Franciscan power and prestige. 16
The diminution of Franciscan power resulting from the Ornedal y Maza
affair could be clearly seen by 1753 in Governor Velez Cachupfn's comprehensive report to the viceroy on the state of the colony. The document was
highly critical of the mission operations run by the Franciscans, noting that
they were little concerned about their neophytes and calling into question
their "dedication and diligence." In the past such a condemnation by a civil
officer would have quickly drawn a vociferous response from the friars, but
none was forthcoming. Velez Cachupfn had effectively muted the Franciscans and secured clear hegemony over the friars in New MexicoY
The appointment of a new governor in 1754, dpn Francisco Marfn del
Valle, led to no improvement in the friars' position, for he kept in place the
virtual gag order against the Franciscans. Only Inquisitional documents
could freely leave the region, and government officials refused to certify most
other Franciscan documents. For example, when the custos, fray Jacobo
Castro, inspected all the missions in 1755, alcaldes mayores from the respective districts observed him throughout; however, they refused to certify any
part of the inspection and in the end Santiago Roybal, the Diocese of Durango's vicar and ecclesiastical judge, endorsed Castro's report-a hum ilia-
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tion in itself for the Franciscans. These civil obstructions effectively reduced
the volume of Franciscan documents in the 1750S to a fraction of what it had
been in earlier periods. If the friars could neither present their views nor defend themselves in the higher councils of Spanish government, they were
virtually impotent·to influence affairs in the colony. By the conclusion of
Marfn del Valle's administration in 1759, the Franciscans had been relegated
to virtual nonentities in New Mexico, except in spiritual matters. IS
The rapid erosion of the Franciscan position with local officials during the
1750S was further evidenced by their reaction to the bishop of Durango's visita
(inspection) in 1760. The matter of episcopal jurisdiction had been a lengthy,
acrimonious affair in New Mexico's history. In fact, the Franciscans contested
the authority of the Diocese of Durango since that episcopate was created by
royal order in 1621. As long as the Franciscans were free of a bishop's control,
they were the religious masters of the colony. In a series of confrontations between 1715 and 1737, the Diocese of Durango had gained control ofNew Mexico. During this time, the Franciscans still resisted diocesan authority and had
made two previous episcopal visitas difficult forthe bishops. However by 1760,
Bishop don Pedro Tamaron y Romeral encountered no Franciscan snubs; the
friars bent over backwards to accommodate him. The bishop wrote that they
responded to him "as if they were secular priests." Primarily, the Franciscans
viewed Bishop Tameron y Romeral as a potential ally against civil authorities
and made him aware of the abuses they had suffered at the hands of recent
governors. The friars continued to tolerate diocesan interactions even after
the visita. When Tamaron y Romeral asked for periodic reports, the Franciscans dutifully supplied them, and they protested no other instructions from
Durango. Clearly, they no longer viewed the diocese as their ma;n foe. 19
A brief period ofgubernatorial instability may have given the Franciscans
hope of regaining some lost influence, but whatever opening they saw soon
closed when Velez Cachupfn returned to Santa Fe in 1762 to begin a second
term as governor. At the time Spain was faring poorly in the Seven Years' War,
and once again Puebloans and Spaniards in New Mexico suffered from
destructive Comanche, Apache, and Ute raids. The Crown ordered Velez
Cachupfn to stabilize and defend Spain's northern colony, and he succeeded. Bp767 the native people along New Mexico's frontiers had been
reasonably pacified. 20
Velez Cachupfn renewed his executive pressure on the friars as well. He
. reported to the viceroy that the Franciscans collected funds for far too many
missionaries. No friars had filled the two empty positions at Zuni during the
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past year, and two of the missions in the Junta de los Rios district were without friars. In addition, six other friars, because "of their advanced age. and
habitual indisposition," were unfit to serve as Christian evangelicals. The
governor wanted these Franciscan deficiencies corrected or government stipends permanently revoked for ten posts. Incredibly, the Franciscans in New
Mexico made no response to these charges but left their defense to the provincial of Santo Evangelio. The government, however, maintained the number of Franciscan posts in New Mexico at this time. Significantly, in 1763, the
Spanish Crown allocated to New Mexico only 11,450 pesos for the mission
program in contrast to approximately 32,000 pesos that went to the presidial
garrison in Santa Fe. From an accounting perspective alone, the importance
of the evangelical work had been eclipsed by political and military agendas. 21
Indeed, His Majesty's government remained concerned about defending
New Spain's northern frontier and, in 1766, the Marques de Rubi visited New
Mexico to assess its defenses as part ofan inspection ofthe military security and
presidial system across the northern frontier. In previous in~pections, the mission operations had always factored into considerations of frontier policy, but
the marques's report, failing to mention the friars at all, reflected their decreased importance. In fact, the marques's inspection gave rise to the Regla-

mento de 1772 (Regulation of 1772), which, among other policies, further
increased presidial salaries. In the new pay scale, a priest serving as presidial ..
chaplain received 480 pesos per year while a Franciscan missionary's alms
remained fixed at 330 pesos. The difference further attested to the reduced
status of evangelicals. 22 Governor Velez Cachupin's second administration
. ended in 1767. He had dispatched other reports critical of the Franciscan mission program to Mexico City, but the friars mustered no defense against his
neg~tive assessments. Perhaps his restoration ofsome peace and security to the
region had engendered gratitude among some friars. Still, the Franciscans'
position had further eroded.
The installation of a new governor, don Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta,
offered little hope for the Franciscans. Appointed in 1767, he was an experienced military man with an administrative background. Two ominous events
for the New Mexico friars transpired early in Fermin de Mendinueta's tenure. First, Charles III ordered the expulsion of the Jesuits from the New
World. For New Mexico's friars, the expulsion ofthe Society ofJesus removed
a long-time Franciscan rival from the mission field. No longer would the
Franciscans have to worry about or contest their jurisdictional bo{mdary with
Jesuits to the west. However, the Crown's aggressive act must have also re-

170? NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 76, NUMBER 2

minded some friars that Bourbon policy continued to weaken Catholic authority and subordinate the church to the Spanish secular government. If the
monarchy could arbitrarily expel the Jesuits, the king could deal the same
treatment to the Order ofSt. Francis. As the Society ofJesus vacated the frontier, the Franciscans took over its missions in northern New Spain, stretching Francisc~n resour'ces even thinner.
The second grave development involved a viceregal plan to secularize
Spanish villas - specifically El Paso, Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Santa Cruz
de la Canada-in New Mexico. In 1765 Bishop Tamaron y Romeral offered
three reasons why these sites should be taken from the Franciscans. First, he
noted the Franciscans' historical reluctance to cooperate with diocesan officials; second, he described the friars' many failures with the Puebloan people
and the ordds inability to improve its evangelical performance; and third,
the region's inhabitants continued to practice witchcraft and other idolatries.
Tamaron y Romeral submitted this petition during the second administration
of Velez Cachupfn, and the friars in New Mexico did not defend themselves,
leaving Santo Evangelio officials to argue against the bishop's proposalY
The viceregal ruling on Tamar6n y Romeral's petition did not come until
near the end ofFermfn de Mendinueta's first year as governor. Based on the
advice of his fiscal (royal attorney), the viceroy (the marques de Croix) rejected Tamaron y Romeral's request. The fiscal noted that the bishop ofDurango had not fulfilled all proper legal requirements. His Majesty's law
expected him to offer the viceroy at least two secular priests as candidates for
each parish position. Tamar6n y Romeral had recommended only one priest
in all, for the post in El Paso. Furthermore, the fiscal noted, the bishop of
Durango's main reason to secularize these villas originated in his displeasure
with the friars' work among the Puebloan people, not the Spanish parishioners in the villas. 24 Despite the victory, the Franciscans still had little reason
to celebrate the viceroy's ruling. The fiscal's opinion did not rule out secularizing these communities, but declared only that Tamaron y Romeral had
not followed proper procedures. The bishop died before he could respond to
this rejection. Although his successor did not pursue the matter, the threat
continued to hang over the Franciscans. Indeed, secularization of these villas would take place near the end of the century.
Throughout most of Fermfn de Mendinueta's administration, lasting until

1778, the governor avoided major clashes with the Franciscans. These were
some of the most difficult years for the inhabitants of New Mexico. The peace
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hammered out with the Comanche people by Governor Velez CachupIn
broke down in 1768, and Comanche raiders, soon joined by other nomadic
tribes, made life miserable for Spaniards and Puebloans alike. Between 1768
and 1778 virtually every Spanish villa (including Santa Fe) and Franciscan
mission experienced the terror of an attack: This situation was made more
pernicious by a severe drought that began in the early 1770S and lasted about
ten years. Crops failed and livestock died en masse. Comanche assaults made
unsafe laboring in the fields. As food production declined, the threat of famine stalked New Mexico. Indian thefts oflivestock became so enormous that
the Spanish government sent 1,5°0 horses to New Mexico in 1775. Spaniards
crowded into larger communities for safety, while others joined the exodus
to El Paso. 25
Amid such unrelenting crises, FermIn de Mendinueta devoted his attention primarily to the defense of New Mexico, and the friars just tried to stay
alive, performing little evangelical work in the process. Several times, the
governor complained to Mexico City that the friars failed to provide regular
religious services, that many friars were incompetent, and that some missions
remained without staff. The Franciscans' response to FermIn de Mendinueta's negative reports was silence, although the Franciscan hierarchy acted
by sending DomInguez to New Mexico in 1776.26
DomInguez, too, failed to right the Franciscan cart. In response to his
report, some friars were replaced and fresh missionaries, posted to New Mexico. However, any positive developments soon vanished in the great smallpox
epidemic of 1780-1781. Approximately one-quarter of New Mexico's population succumbed, a decline sufficient enough for the new governor, don Juan
Bautista de Anza, to.request successfully the number of Franciscan billets be
lowered from thirty-four to twenty. This loss represented the first official reduction in the number of Franciscan personnel in New Mexico. From this
time forward, the Franciscans' presence further dwindled and the position of
the friars, once the rival of local officers, had been eclipsed. 27
Numerous historical forces contributed to the collapse of Franciscan
power in New Mexico during the eighteenth century. Due to the legacy of
el ana achenta - "the year eighty," as Franciscan documents sometimes referred to the Pueblo Revolt-and the turbulent reconquest period, friars
sought a more accommodating relationship with the Puebloans than they
had observed in the seventeenth century. Although this new posture created
a more pacific mission climate throughout New Mexico, it opened the friars
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to civil charges of evangelical incompetence. In addition, the Franciscan
hierarchy in Mexico City maintained an inflexible mission program that hurt
the friars. Priests were sent to New Mexico ill prepared to serve among the
Natives, especially in regard to language, and then left in the mission field far
too long. Their position eroded further when the Bishopric of Durango established jurisdiction over New Mexico during the 1730S. No longer did friars hold absolute sway over matters of faith. And finally, the growing strength
oflocal government during the 170os, culminating in the critical 1750-1780
period, played a crucial part in the Franciscan demise. Bolstering the power
oflocal civil officials atthe expense of the church hallmarked Bourbon policy
during this period. The Crown sought to centralize power and make the em-.
pire efficierit, profitable, and secure. The king broke the back of any institutions opposed, to these goals. Franciscan missions in New Mexico fell into
that category, and consequently the hegemony of the state over the Catholic
Church became one of the primary causes in the breakdown of Franciscan
power in New Mexico.
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